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Foreword 
 
This document covers a wide range of topics related to the potential mitigation of the effects of 
chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) weapons—or so-called weapons of mass 
destruction—on buildings and their occupants. Since the CBRN threats of interest for this report 
are primarily airborne, and since the survivability of a nuclear attack primarily must consider 
airborne threats, the need for mitigation strategies related to air-handling systems (HVAC 
systems) in buildings follows directly and is an important concern of this report. However, the 
overall issues are largely planning issues, as guidance on HVAC systems tasks has already been 
developed and is available. 
 
This report gives some indication of the effects of the Internet age: every reference except two 
was accessed via the Internet, and all references except three have an Internet access address 
provided. 
 
As a nation we are being told, relative to potential threats from extremists or natural disasters, to 
embrace the Boy Scout motto, “Be Prepared.” This report presents one small area that federal 
agencies and others can use as a resource in preparing to increase security of individual 
organizations. 
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Executive Summary 
 
Many changes in America have resulted from the large-scale attacks of September 11, 2001, 
against civilian populations by extremists. A Department of Homeland Security has been created. 
Increased abilities to mitigate attacks by weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) have been 
recommended by prestigious bodies. U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Secretary 
Spencer Abraham has declared that security is core to DOE’s mission. Federal agencies have 
promulgated directives requiring increased security against WMD attacks. Federal facility 
managers have asked DOE’s Federal Energy Management Program (FEMP) if there is any 
assistance that can be provided to deal with the directives, especially those related to building 
ventilation systems. This document provides initial guidance. 
 
Assuming that WMDs can be scoped as 
comprising chemical, biological, 
radiological, nuclear, and (high-yield) 
explosive (CBRNE) agents, the subset of 
WMDs addressed in this document involves 
CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear) agents. Since CBRN threats, excluding 
the direct explosive nuclear threat, are primarily airborne, building air-handling, or HVAC, 
systems become an important concern. This report is intended to provide a starting point allowing 
federal facility managers to develop plans for CBRN incident mitigation measures that can be 
implemented for their buildings and HVAC systems. 
 
Assessing CBRN threats, buildings, and their 
HVAC systems is a complex task. A 
technically sound, defensible assessment of 
the combination of CBRN threats to buildings 
and their HVAC systems is even more 
complex. Since buildings have people in them 
and require people to keep them operating 
correctly, the threat must be assessed in a 
comprehensive manner, with an emphasis on 
survivability and safety. This report provides 
background on personal preparedness, the 
nature of CBRN threats, and the larger context 
for CBRN threat mitigation. 
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Guidance and directives on building threats and risk assessments have mushroomed almost 
beyond the ability of individuals to assimilate and analyze. Emergency preparedness has become 
a major national undertaking, reminiscent of the Civil Defense efforts of the 1950s, but more 
complicated and extensive. Diverse areas of technology development have been recommended 
and are being pursued. Prospective research and development (R&D) for new and advanced 
technologies to apply to emergency preparedness and threat mitigation is being evaluated by 
many organizations. However, funding for extensive capital investments to enhance building 
security for all federal facilities is tight. Information and methods to even approximately quantify 
the potential threat posed by CBRN agents to federal buildings is mostly nonexistent.  
 
In this overall context, federal facility managers are hard-pressed to meet directives for increasing 
facility security against potential CBRN threats. This guide briefly describes the steps needed to 
develop CBRN threat 
mitigation measures and 
strategies and indicates links 
to the many resources that can 
help in this overall endeavor. 
It provides a  brief, simplified 
example of a federal agency 
that implements CBRN 
incident mitigation measures 
related to building HVAC 
systems and personnel. The 
steps illustrated in this 
example can be undertaken 
with limited resources.  
 
The improvements that appear to be needed in order to make effective improvements in facility 
security are as follows: 
• New technologies under development — e.g., biological agent sensors, improved 
chemical sensors — need to be made ready for use. 
• An overall integration of multiple methods and technologies has not yet been 
implemented and tested. Therefore, it is expected that major integration improvements 
will be needed. 
• Expertise on building and HVAC systems, in combination with expertise on CBRN 
threats, appears limited. Some guidance has been developed, but too many pieces are still 
missing, such as how to integrate personnel actions effectively with selected 
technologies. 
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• Facility managers are expected to need outside expertise to more effectively assess 
potential CBRN mitigation measures for their facilities. The procurement of  outside 
expertise is expected to be a challenge because there is not a clear definition of the 
expertise needed. 
• Energy efficiency is an interest of FEMP, and initial ideas for ways to integrate energy 
efficiency and building security have been developed, but much more work is required to 
understand the potential benefits and workable solutions to synergistic issues 
• Better alignment and eventual standardization of methods and approaches used to assess 
CBRN risks for building HVAC systems will be needed. Those developed to date do not 
appear adequate to deal with certain unique requirements of HVAC systems — systems 
that are critical relative to potential CBRN threats. 
 
Readers of this guide can use the information presented and the resources identified to work 
through an overall process to select and prioritize CBRN incident mitigation measures for facility 
HVAC systems and people. Results should be at least marginally acceptable in the short term, but 
many future changes in federal policy and technologies are expected to keep the overall 
mitigation selection process in flux for years to come. 
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Introduction 
 
he events of September 11, 2001, have caused many changes in 
America. Among these changes is an increased emphasis on 
security, including the creation of the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS). In addition to the proliferation of changes in 
government at all levels, guidance and directives have mushroomed 
such that agencies can assimilate and analyze them only with 
difficulty. For the U.S. Department of Energy, Secretary 
Spencer Abraham has declared that security is core to the Department 
of Energy’s (DOE’s) mission. 
 
DOE’s Federal Energy Management Program (FEMP) works to reduce the cost and 
environmental impact of the federal government by advancing energy efficiency and water  
  conservation, promoting the use of distributed and renewable energy, and  
    improving utility management decisions at federal sites. FEMP helps  
    federal energy managers identify, design, and implement new  
    construction and facility improvement projects. As part of this work, 
FEMP has received several requests from agencies to assist them in dealing with security aspects 
of their building energy systems — most often the building heating, 
ventilating, and air-conditioning (HVAC) systems. This document is 
intended to assist federal agencies in understanding the overall HVAC 
security picture and also in dealing with the wide range of activities 
that could come under the call to make HVAC systems more secure 
against many types of threats. A wide range of resources is also 
described briefly and referenced. 
 
For military installations, new standards and guidance documents from the Department of 
Defense (DoD) and from individual services and agencies have moved security of facilities to a 
high level. The resulting difficulties and variety of costs related to bombed facilities over the past 
20 years have had a noticeable impact. As stated in paragraph 1-1 of UFC 4-010-01, July 2002, 
the new guidance “represents a significant commitment by DoD to seek effective ways to 
minimize the likelihood of mass casualties from terrorist attacks against DoD personnel in the 
buildings in which they work and live” (DOD 2002). 
 
The primary threat covered by UFC 4-010 is the threat from explosives. One scheme of 
categorizing threats to facilities includes chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and (high-
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yield) explosive (CBRNE) incidents. The explosive threat is primarily considered to be against 
people, facility structural members, and facility containment, and is not a focus of this document, 
since it does not pertain to HVAC systems. The radiological threat is related to the nuclear threat 
but essentially different, since a radiological threat involves radiological contamination, while a 
nuclear threat involves a nuclear blast. 
 
This document was formed under the umbrella of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 
(CBRN) security for HVAC systems in facilities. A graded approach to CBRN security or safety 
for facility HVAC systems is important. The term “graded approach” is used primarily for DOE 
facilities relative to safety, and in particular, for nuclear facility safety analyses. The importance 
of the graded approach lies in balancing real-world resource limitations against a potentially 
unrealistically high need for resources to achieve complete safety, while still achieving an 
appropriate high(er) level of safety. A definition of “graded approach” is provided in the Code of 
Federal Regulations, 10 CFR 830.3: 
 
Graded approach means the process of ensuring that the level of analysis, documentation, and 
actions used to comply with a requirement in this part are commensurate with:  
(1) The relative importance to safety, safeguards, and security;  
(2) The magnitude of any hazard involved;  
(3) The life cycle stage of a facility;  
(4) The programmatic mission of a facility;  
(5) The particular characteristics of a facility;  
(6) The relative importance of radiological and nonradiological hazards; and  
(7) Any other relevant factor.  
 
Some adaptation and extension of this definition is needed to allow a better match to the topic of 
CBRN security for facility HVAC systems. Required adaptations include changing the notion of 
“compliance” to one of using analysis, documentation, and actions to achieve the best solutions 
with the resources available. Readers must understand that the tradeoffs required are large, and 
risk assessments performed to define the levels of threats that will be addressed may have 
potentially large uncertainties. 
 
As stated in the Air Force Installation Force Protection Guide (U.S. Air Force n.d., 1. 
Introduction, D. Assumptions): “There are no universal solutions to preclude terrorist attacks, 
since the threat is largely unpredictable and certainly will change over time.” And beyond the 
boundary of terrorist attacks lie potential natural disasters, major accidents or incidents, and 
events caused by mentally deranged individuals simply to cause high levels of disruption. The 
same Air Force “Assumptions” section also quotes the U.S. Department of State (DOS 1995) in 
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regard to embassy buildings: “No matter how many measures are implemented risk is always 
present.” 
 
The present document attempts to provide a starting point for federal facility managers to begin 
implementing CBRN security and safety procedures and measures for HVAC systems in their 
facilities. Potential threats must be weighed against available resources, as well as evaluated in 
the context of the facilities and personnel in the 
facilities to be protected. 
 
Keeping in mind that the information, resources, and 
requirements related to CBRN protection of facilities 
and personnel are so extensive as to be difficult to 
assimilate, and that these are changing at a fast pace, 
this guide will be unable to cover all materials 
related to the diverse topics involved in a process of 
CBRN protection of HVAC systems. The goal is to 
provide enough information to allow facilities 
personnel to proceed as best possible. 
 
CBRN protection of HVAC systems in federal facilities must be considered in the larger context 
of protection of personnel, preservation of federal critical infrastructure, and overall security of 
federal facilities. Because of the interrelatedness of these issues, some level of background 
information on several topics will be presented in this report. Since FEMP is primarily concerned 
with energy efficiency of federal facilities, connections between efficiency and security will also 
be touched on briefly. 
 
This document has been developed by DOE’s Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) in support 
of FEMP’s mission to assist federal agencies. 
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In the News 
 
s this report is being prepared in the autumn of 2004, the nature of the facilities security 
picture is evolving continuously: 
 
• Brussels, Belgium, May 3, 2004: Black Dawn scenario-based exercise on catastrophic 
terrorism held; emphasized prevention instead of consequence management, involving 
current and former senior officials and experts from the European Council, the European 
Commission, NATO, 15 member states, and various international organizations 
• Emergency management in the security state is now a topic in security presentations, 
where our country has conceptually moved from the administrative through the 
entitlement to the security state, and the Homeland Security environment (the security 
state) is a strong factor in the future of the country 
• December 17, 2003: 
Homeland Security 
Presidential 
Directive (HSPD) 8, 
“National 
Preparedness,” is 
implemented with 16 
major initiatives to 
prevent and respond 
to threatened or 
actual domestic terrorist attacks, major disasters and other emergencies. Additional 
national guidance is expected in March 2005. 
• In addition, DHS must deal with 
o the National Strategy for Homeland Security 
o the National Incident Management System (NIMS) 
o the National Response Plan (NRP) 
o the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP, under HSPD-7) 
• Areas of responsibility related to preparedness include 
 ○ Prevention / deterrence    ○  Hazard mitigation  
 ○ Infrastructure protection    ○  Evacuation / shelter 
 ○ Preparedness      ○  Victim care 
 ○ Emergency assessment / diagnosis   ○  Investigation / apprehension 
 ○ Emergency management / response   ○  Recovery / remediation 
A 
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• Officers Start Wearing Vests to Shield From Bio-Attacks, Updated: Monday, Sep. 27, 
2004 — 6:05 AM 
WASHINGTON (AP) - Some U.S. Capitol Police officers have begun donning new 
protective vests and carrying hoods designed to shield them from a biological or 
chemical attack. 
The Washington Post reports, a handful of officers were wearing the new vests on 
Friday. A hazard suit, gloves, and boots are sealed into the back of each vest, and a 
one-time protective hood with special filters is attached to the side. 
Officers underwent 40 hours of special training before receiving the vests. 
The vests are part of an aggressive and unusually public effort to prevent a terrorist 
attack before and during the upcoming presidential election. The election is in 36 
days. 
The region’s Joint Terrorism Task Force will meet with local and federal officials in 
Arlington this week to discuss potential threats. 
 
• N.M. town to become anti-terrorism training site 
Homeland Security funding purchase of entire ghost town 
By Simon Romero, New York Times News Service 
September 26, 2004 
PLAYAS, N.M. — The Phelps Dodge mining company pictured a suburban utopia 
with a Southwestern flavor when it built this town for its employees from scratch in 
the early 1970s. It incorporated a six-lane bowling alley, a rodeo ring, a helicopter 
pad, a shooting range and a swimming pool into the community of 259 ranch-style 
homes. 
But the company shut its nearby copper smelter because of sluggish prices in the late 
1990s. 
The 50 or so remaining residents of Playas say they are ready for their town to 
become a target for pickups laden with explosives and simulations of suicide bombs, 
water-supply poisoning and anthrax attacks. 
In what might be the beginning of Playas’ renaissance, the Department of Homeland 
Security is channeling $5 million to a small New Mexico engineering school to buy 
the entire town. The school, in turn, aims to turn the town into one of the country’s top 
locations for anti-terrorism training. 
“I wish they’d hurry up and start hiring people,” Carol Davis, 51, a part-time 
emergency medical technician, said. “It’s too quiet out here right now. I’d like a job 
driving an ambulance or something.” 
The isolation of Playas is part of the allure for New Mexico Tech, which expects to 
complete the purchase in the next few weeks. 
“Playas is not your typical ghost town with a saloon and a couple of storefronts, which 
is what made it so attractive to us,” said Van Romero, vice president for research and 
economic development at New Mexico Tech, based in the town of Socorro. 
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The university, which has 1,800 students, has trained more than 90,000 emergency 
workers to respond to terror attacks since the Oklahoma City bombing of 1995. 
Altogether, it is receiving $20 million in grants from the Department of Homeland 
Security for anti-terrorism programs. 
Playas will be used mostly to train security, medical and military personnel to prevent 
attacks as well as respond to them. Romero said he would not ask residents to leave 
before the “attacks.” 
• News Releases 
o FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE, May 07, 2004 
SAIC Awarded U.S. Army Contract to Serve as Lead Systems Integrator for the 
Guardian Installation Protection Program 
(MCLEAN, VA and HUNTSVILLE, AL) – SAIC announced today it has won a 
contract from the U.S. Army’s Space and Missile Defense Command in Huntsville, 
Ala., to serve as the Guardian Installation Protection Program Lead Systems Integrator 
(LSI). The Guardian Installation Protection Program is managed by the Joint Project 
Manager Guardian (JPMG) for the Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and 
Biological Defense (JPEO-CBD). Working under the JPMG, SAIC will provide an 
integrated chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear protection (CBRN) capability 
at 200 Department of Defense (DoD) installations and facilities worldwide. This cost-
plus-fixed-fee contract will be performed over a base of three years with the potential 
of earning up to three one-year award terms. The cumulative value of the contract is 
$390 million.  
The Installation Protection Program is a Family of Systems that supplements other 
aspects of force protection against potential weapons of mass destruction. The Family 
of Systems will include capability for CBRN detection, identification, warning, 
reporting, decision support, individual and collective protection, emergency response, 
decontamination, medical countermeasures, medical diagnostics, and medical 
surveillance components and will be tailored to the needs of each installation. As LSI, 
SAIC will work with JPMG to design, procure, integrate, install and test the Family of 
Systems. After the system is fully installed, SAIC will facilitate an installation-wide 
weapons of mass destruction exercise. . . . 
 
The smattering of news reports provided here is intended to give a flavor of the types of ongoing 
activities related to CBRN threat protection. These items are not even the tip of the iceberg, since 
many activities, such as those of the U.S. Department of State and many military activities, are 
not made known to the public, and many other activities of state and local governments are not 
well reported. The “Family of Systems” mentioned in the paragraph above indicates the diversity. 
 
These news reports should leave no doubt that major changes are in progress that 
will affect efforts to implement CBRN threat protection and mitigation over at 
least the next several years. The change appears similar to the Civil Defense 
efforts of the 1950s, but on a larger and much more complicated scale. 
Responsibilities will shift and change; requirements appear likely to grow. 
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Critical Infrastructure 
 
HS has responsibilities for protection of critical infrastructure and, as mentioned in the 
previous section of this report, currently must oversee development of a national plan on 
defining and protecting critical infrastructure. In this effort, extensive interaction with other 
federal agencies and with private sector entities is necessary. Some overlap of responsibilities 
with other agencies that have critical infrastructure is inevitable, although the responsibility for 
agency-specific critical infrastructure may be delegated. 
 
Several critical infrastructure sectors and a general pool of critical resources have been identified 
(Office of the President 2003). The sectors listed here number 12 and differ slightly, based on 
later reporting: 
 
● Agriculture and food ● Information and Telecommunications 
● Water ● Energy 
● Public Health ● Transportation 
● Emergency Services ● Banking and Finance 
● Government ● Chemical Industry and Hazardous Materials 
● Defense Industrial Base ● Postal and Shipping  
 
The critical resources pool includes national monuments and icons, nuclear power plants, dams, 
government facilities, and key commercial assets. Many questions and decisions must still be 
made regarding the plan for critical infrastructure and how protection efforts will begin. 
 
Many federal sites have some critical infrastructures on a 
smaller scale. Some, like the defense industrial base, 
include facilities owned and operated by DoD. The Postal 
Service is discretely identified. Federal agencies and 
facilities are involved in critical infrastructure in a major 
way, and critical infrastructure protection has been a focus 
area for government entities at least since the late 1990s. 
 
In addition to government efforts, many public and private 
committees and organizations and private industry, 
university, and trade association committees and 
organizations are forming around topics related to 
protection of critical infrastructure. Since many of these 
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entities are new, and since the major increase in efforts on emergency preparedness and homeland 
security is new, well-defined charters and programs of effort do not appear to be highly visible. 
As homeland security efforts continue to increase, however, program definitions are likely to take 
better form. The changes that are occurring are expected to have impacts on all local facility 
planning related to CBRN protection. 
 
Extensive research is needed relative to improving our ability to protect critical infrastructure. 
Urgent research opportunities identified by the NRC (2002) indicate that the following 
technological initiatives are needed to improve our ability to protect critical infrastructure from 
CBRN attacks: 
 
• Develop effective treatments and preventatives for known pathogens for which current 
responses are ineffective and for potential emerging pathogens 
• Develop, test, and implement an intelligent, adaptive electric-power grid 
• Advance the practical utility of data fusion and data mining for intelligence analysis, and 
enhance information security against cyber attacks 
• Develop new and better technologies (e.g., protective gear, sensors, communications) for 
emergency responders 
• Advance engineering design technologies and fire-rating standards for blast- and fire-
resistant buildings 
• Develop sensor and surveillance systems (for a wide range of targets) that create useful 
information for emergency officials and decisions makers 
• Develop new methods and standards for filtering air against both chemicals and 
pathogens as well as better methods and standards for decontamination 
 
The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical 
Infrastructures and Key Assets (Office of the President 2003) is 
available from the White House web site (see references). This strategy 
report is the product of many months of consultation across a broad 
range of stakeholders. The report identifies major protection initiatives 
in general terms for the critical infrastructure sectors identified above. 
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People Are Important 
 
he Department of Defense Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for Buildings (DoD 2002) 
states that DoD is making a significant commitment “to minimize the likelihood of mass 
casualties from terrorist attacks against DoD personnel.” Obviously, people and personnel are 
critically important. The applicable DoD program area is the Antiterrorism/Force Protection 
Program (AT/FP).  
 
The Guardian Installation Protection Program mentioned 
in one of the previously cited news releases is a major 
effort to take current force protection to the next level, 
using available technologies, to strengthen CBRN 
protection. The Guardian charter states that it will “provide 
DoD prioritized installations with an integrated CBRN protection and response capability to 
reduce casualties, maintain critical operations, contain contamination and effectively restore 
critical operations.”1 
 
In the Guardian effort, the solution set for their objectives to be considered initially, before actual 
implementation, includes 
• first responder equipment 
• CBRN sensors 
• medical surveillance and protection 
• information management 
• training 
• procedures/processes 
• CONOPS (concept of operations) development 
• interaction with local communities; dependence/support 
• augmentation of physical security design 
 
Recognizing the importance of scarce resources, Guardian plans to have the installation design 
evolve over time, while focusing on improving capability and lowering sustainment costs. 
(Sustainment occurs after one year, when the DoD entity takes over from the installing entities.) 
 
                                                     
1 Material on the Guardian program is taken from an “Industry Briefing,” August 21, 2003, by Col. Camille 
Nichols, project manager. JPEO-CBD is the Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological 
Defense of DoD (http://www.jpeocbd.osd.mil ). More recent briefing materials and additional information 
are also available on the JPEO-CBD web site. 
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The Guardian effort appears important for examining what can currently be achieved in 
protecting people and facilities from the effects of CBRN incidents. 
 
Recognizing that people are critically important and are at the top of the protection list, a brief 
digression is covered here on the topic of preparedness of people. In the event of a CBRN attack, 
recognizing that risk cannot be reduced to zero, people should understand how to deal with the 
full range of resulting hazards.  
 
DHS has created the Ready.Gov web site (http://www.ready.gov/) to offer resources for 
preparedness of individuals, businesses, and children (“coming soon”). As of this writing, the 
Ready America area for individuals has a banner reading, “Terrorism forces us to make a choice. 
Don’t be afraid … Be Ready.” This web site offers information 
on CBRN events and what individuals can do. The site also 
covers explosions and many types of natural disasters. 
Informing employees or other people who spend extensive 
time in facilities where CBRN response plans are being 
developed about the Ready.Gov web site appears appropriate, 
while also cautioning or informing them about differences 
between the Ready.Gov recommendations and local 
procedures that have been or are being developed. 
 
RAND has developed a report on individual preparedness that 
is designed to supplement the Ready.Gov web site information on individual preparedness. The  
short version of the RAND report (Davis et al. 2003) is probably the most useful and the easiest 
to access online. This guide is another resource that organizations interested in increasing their 
CBRN responsiveness could consider sharing with employees and other people using their 
facilities on a regular basis. 
 
These information resources are more sobering than uplifting. The nature of the Guardian charter 
presented above should be carefully considered, as it mentions “reduction of casualties,” 
containment of contamination, and maintaining and restoring critical (not necessarily all) 
operations. 
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Understanding CBRN Threats 
 
xtensive information is available on chemical and biological threats; less is available on 
radiological and nuclear threats. The detonation of a nuclear device would produce 
extensive blast and fire damage, intense direct radiation effects, and possibly widespread 
contamination from radioactive fallout. The hazards from radioactive fallout would be similar, 
but potentially much more severe, than those resulting from the release of a radiological agent. In 
this discussion of protective preparedness actions, the blast and thermal effects of a nuclear 
incident will be assumed to be at some distance from a facility. 
 
CBRN incidents include both deliberate events and accidents. For example, a chemical incident 
inside or outside a building might result from an accidental or a deliberate chemical release or 
from a fire. The nature of the hazard resulting from a CBRN incident depends on the type of 
incident, the hazardous material released, the location of the release, and possibly the 
meteorological conditions at the time. If an incident occurs, a rapid assessment of the severity of 
the hazard would be required. In the sections that follow, the various types of CBRN threats—
chemical and biological, radiological, and nuclear blasts—are discussed separately.  
 
Chemical and Biological Agents 
The potential threat of chemical and biological (CB) agents to buildings is usually exaggerated, 
although a concerted, skillful attack could be devastating. Although CB agents can be very 
dangerous, many conditions affect their lethality, and mitigation can be attained by many means. 
The RAND guide (Davis et al. 2003) covers specific recommended individual responses, with 
overarching goals, during potential CBRN events. For example, for a 
chemical incident, the overarching goal is to find clean air to breathe, and 
several means of mitigation and survival are discussed for different 
situations. Examination of individual preparedness measures also gives 
some insight into possible facility or building preparedness. 
 
Terrorists continue to prefer explosives (see, for example, FEMA 2003d); explosives are more 
dramatic and easier to obtain than chemicals. Chemicals are easier to obtain than biological 
agents, but the potential lethality of biological agents can be much higher. Chemical agents 
include Sarin, cyanides, chlorine, mustard gas, phosgene, VX, and many others. The Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) maintain a web site that has extensive information on 
chemical and biological agents (http://www.bt.cdc.gov/). This source is a reasonable place to start 
E 
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to begin understanding specific biotoxic threats. For definitions of specific chemicals, a standard 
web search using a search engine may be more useful.  
 
Preparedness can be an important factor in addressing CB attacks. In World War I, German 
troops using chlorine killed approximately 5,000 Allied soldiers at Ypres, Belgium, in 1915. The 
attack had warning signs, but without a precedent and an awareness of the threat, the signs were 
not recognized. Warning signs included the movement of over 5,000 cylinders of chlorine into 
German trenches about 200 yards away, a strange hissing sound upon release, and a yellow-green 
cloud of chlorine coming toward them. Wind was an obvious factor in this delivery method. 
 
This first attack, on unprepared soldiers, resulted in one death for every 70 pounds of agent 
released. However, overall during the war, there was one death for every two tons of agent 
released — a not very effective weapon. Preparedness increased, but 
the difficulty of delivering the chemical agents in a lethal manner 
also led to death reductions. Having to deliver 70 pounds of material 
to achieve one death is problematic. The need for two tons of agent 
per person killed appears likely to discourage any terrorist, since 
explosives are much more lethal per pound. 
 
When chemical and biological agents are released outside, dispersal 
occurs far too quickly in many cases, and erratic winds can even 
push the agents back onto those releasing them. So levels of skillfulness and planning are 
required to accomplish deadly objectives when using outside release of such agents. Indoor 
release has the potential to be more effective, but there must be a means of dispersal, and the 
agent typically has to be smuggled into or onto the building first.  
 
Among biological agents, anthrax is known to be one of the most deadly if inhaled; and tularemia 
bacteria, Ebola virus, encephalitis viruses and others can also be deadly. If working with deadly 
chemicals is both dangerous and challenging, working with highly toxic 
biological agents is an order of magnitude worse. From a terrorist’s 
perspective, procedures for working with anthrax must prevent him from 
becoming infected unintentionally or spreading spores that could lead 
investigators back to the source. Someone has to be strongly committed and 
have extensive experience with biological production cleanroom and sterile 
culturing procedures. Production labs would probably have to be moved at 
intervals, as slight contamination evidence would accumulate if spore material were transported. 
Again, explosives are easier. 
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Experience with biological terrorism is fairly limited. In the United States the anthrax incidents 
along the East Coast in 2001 led to five deaths. The last case previous to 2001 was in 1979. This 
incident, in Sverdlosk, Russia, led to 68 deaths out of 79 exposures from an anthrax release 
estimated at about one gram of material. This incident, which was apparently an accidental 
release of anthrax spores from a Soviet biological weapons facility, indicated how deadly 
bioterrorism weapons might be to users before the weapon is ever deployed. 
 
The Armed Forces have to be very concerned about potential use of chemical and biological 
weapons, and some of their resources are worth highlighting. The Chemical and Biological 
Defense Information Analysis Center (CBIAC) 
provides information on CB threats and also 
analyzes possible threats and threat reduction 
technologies. The web site for this organization 
is: http://www.cbiac.apgea.army.mil/ 
 
The CBIAC has many literature products that can be purchased, and some 
information can be accessed directly. The quarterly CBIAC newsletter has 
pertinent information relative to CB issues (http://www.cbiac.apgea.army.mil/ 
awareness/newsletter/intro.html). The web site has a page covering medical 
aspects of biological agents that allows downloads of PowerPoint presentations on 
different biotoxic agents that were prepared for the Army Office of the Surgeon 
General (http://www.cbiac.apgea.army.mil/products/cr-03-08.html). The 
presentations can also be ordered on a CD for $10. Each presentation is 3–5 MB in size and 30–
40 pages long. The topics covered are 
 
 ! Anthrax     ! Marburg 
 ! Bubonic plague    ! Pneumonic plague 
 ! Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever  ! Rift Valley fever 
 ! Dengue     ! Staphylococcal enterotoxin B (SEB) 
 ! Ebola     ! Smallpox 
 ! Influenza     ! St. Louis encephalitis 
 ! Japanese encephalitis    ! Tularemia 
 ! Lassa 
 
Other web sites also provide CB information. The National Research Council report Making the 
Nation Safer (NRC 2002) is available as a PDF document on the National Academies Press web 
site. A compact description of the characteristics of chemical and biological agents can be found 
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at the web site of the Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Industry Group 
(http://www.nbcindustrygroup.com/handbook/pdf/AGENT_CHARACTERISTICS.pdf). 
 
In addition to DoD’s CBIAC, the Army 
operates the Edgewood Chemical 
Biological Center (ECBC). ECBC often 
uses the same resources as CBIAC. ECBC 
and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
have developed TI 853-01 (USACE 2001) 
on protecting buildings from airborne 
hazards, but it apparently has only been 
released in draft form. TI 853-01 and other 
similar resources will be discussed in later 
sections of this report. 
 
Radiological Devices 
The radiological threat is related to the nuclear threat, since the type of material used to devise a 
weapon is the same, and many health effects are related. The 
radiological threat is covered in some detail in different fact sheets, 
including Radiological Attack, Dirty Bombs and Other Devices 
(NAE 2004), by the National Academies and DHS. The excerpts 
below, taken primarily from fact sheets, describe the nature of 
possible attacks, based mostly on conjecture. 
 
From the National Academy of Engineering (NAE) fact sheet (NAE 
2004): 
 
A radiological attack is the spreading of radioactive material with the intent to do harm. 
Radioactive materials are used every day in laboratories, medical centers, food irradiation 
plants, and for industrial uses. If stolen or otherwise acquired, many of these materials could be 
used in a “radiological dispersal device” (RDD). . . .  
 
The term dirty bomb and RDD are often used interchangeably in technical literature. 
However, RDDs could also include other means of dispersal such as placing a container of 
radioactive material in a public place, or using an airplane to disperse powdered or aerosolized 
forms of radioactive material. . . .  
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It is very difficult to design an RDD that would deliver 
radiation doses high enough to cause immediate health effects 
or fatalities in a large number of people. Therefore, experts 
generally agree that an RDD would most likely be used to: 
■ contaminate facilities or places where people live and work, disrupting lives and 
livelihoods. 
■ cause anxiety in those who think they are being, or have been, exposed. 
 
From Making the Nation Safer (NRC 2002): 
 
The ease of recovery from [a radiological] attack would depend to a great extent on how the 
attack was handled by first responders, political leaders, and the news media, all of which 
would help to shape public opinion and reactions.” 
 
From a February 2003 press kit (DHS 2003) available in the Press Room area of the DHS 
web site: 
 
Radiological dispersion devices (RDDs) are a combination of conventional explosives and 
radioactive material designed to scatter dangerous and sub-lethal amounts of radioactive 
material over a general area. Terrorist use of RDDs is considered far more likely than use of a 
nuclear device because they require very little technical knowledge to build and deploy 
compared to that of a nuclear device. RDDs also appeal to terrorists because certain 
radiological materials are used widely in medicine, agriculture, industry and research, and are 
much more readily available compared to weapons 
grade uranium or plutonium. 
 
The possible use of RDDs appears to have more of 
an impact psychologically than in terms of physical 
harm. The DHS fact sheet goes on to explain how to 
be prepared and what to do if an explosion occurs. 
However, radiation monitoring equipment would be 
needed to determine whether an explosion has led to a radiological release, so the correct 
response would be very difficult to discern for almost all people in the short term. If first 
responders have radiation detection equipment, determination and notification of radiological 
contamination could begin. 
 
As with CB agents, the CDC maintains fairly extensive information on radiation emergencies and 
radiation agents (http://www.bt.cdc.gov/radiation/index.asp). The CDC site also has information 
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on the effects of radiation exposure and potential treatment methods, as well as advice on 
suggested responses in case of a radioactive release. The RAND guide (Davis et al. 2003) also 
provides suggested guidance for individuals in case of a radiological incident. 
 
Nuclear Blast 
Devastation from a nuclear blast would extend far beyond the immediate blast location, fire 
region, and area receiving fallout, as people would be expected to react by leaving the area 
affected. The resulting economic slowdown could be dramatic. Cleanup could be slow and 
difficult, so the economic impacts could be long-lasting also. Much of the more useful 
information on nuclear blast effects is 30–50 years old. The Office of Technology Assessment 
published a study in 1979 (OTA 1979) that is most pertinent, although there have been more 
recent materials published in journals and magazines.  
 
The following is the second paragraph of the OTA study’s Executive Summary: 
 
Nuclear war is not a comfortable subject. Throughout all the variations, possibilities, and 
uncertainties that this study describes, one theme is constant—a nuclear war would be a catastrophe. 
A militarily plausible nuclear attack, even “limited,” could be expected to kill people and to inflict 
economic damage on a scale unprecedented in American 
experience; a large-scale nuclear exchange would be a 
calamity unprecedented in human history. The mind recoils 
from the effort to foresee the details of such a calamity, and 
from the careful explanation of the unavoidable 
uncertainties as to whether people would die from blast 
damage, from fallout radiation, or from starvation during 
the following winter. But the fact remains that nuclear war 
is possible, and the possibility of nuclear war has formed 
part of the foundation of international politics, and of U.S. 
policy, ever since nuclear weapons were used in 1945. 
 
Recovery following a nuclear blast would be dubious close to the center of the blast, so 
preparedness becomes a non-issue there. But large areas would not be affected directly, and the 
effort required for recovery would decrease as distance from the blast center increased. This 
report will assume preparedness applies only to facilities outside the major blast zone. 
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Some perspective from the 1950 National Security Resources 
Board, Civil Defense Office, booklet Survival Under Atomic 
Attack (CDO 1950) is also appropriate to consider, keeping in 
mind that longer-term effects from radiation exposure were not 
well understood at that time: “You can live through an atom 
bomb raid and you won’t have to have a Geiger counter, 
protective clothing, or special training in order to do it.” 
 
Blast effects depend on many factors, including the type of 
weapon, the explosive power of the weapon, whether it is 
detonated in the air or on the ground, and wind. The information in the Civil Defense booklet 
quoted above was based on nuclear devices from the 1950s (low kiloton range), while the OTA 
report discusses weapons of 1–5 megatons. An important consideration relative to blast effect is 
that it increases much less than linearly with device power. A smaller device in the low kiloton 
range can do heavy damage to buildings within about a 2-mile radius. Doubling its power will 
extend the range of damage to only about 2.5 miles. In the same way, for a device 100 times as 
powerful, major damage would reach out only a little more than 10 miles, not 100 times as far. 
From a practical standpoint, many strategically placed smaller devices can do much more damage 
than one large device of the same explosive capacity. 
 
Table 1 gives some idea of  the blast effects of a 1-megaton blast at 6,000 feet. However, many 
smaller devices cause more damage. The U.S. nuclear weapons arsenal typically consists of final 
delivered devices much smaller than 1 megaton, although with multiple warheads, one missile 
might have a greater destructive capacity. The Russian warhead arsenals are similar although 
sometimes larger, in the 0.6-megaton range per device. China apparently has some older 3- and 
5-megaton warhead missiles. 
 
The National Research Council (NRC) report Making the Nation Safer (NRC 2002), in evaluating 
potential threats from terrorists, identifies the state-owned nuclear weapons of Pakistan and India 
as medium risk due to potential political instabilities, and those of Russia as medium risk due to 
large numbers of weapons and poor inventory controls. All other nuclear powers are identified as 
low risk relative to state-owned arsenals. This NRC effort, however, did not consider North 
Korea or Iran, both of which have made headlines since then, so the nuclear threat continues to 
evolve. 
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Table 1. Effects of blast from a nuclear explosion 
Peak over-
pressure Effects 
Distance to 
which effects are 
felt [1] 
20 psi [2] Multi-story reinforced concrete buildings demolished; winds, 
500 miles per hour. 
1.8 mi 
10 psi Most factories and commercial buildings collapsed; small wood 
and brick residences destroyed; winds, 300 miles per hour. 
2.7 mi 
5 psi Unreinforced brick and wood houses destroyed; heavier 
construction, severely damaged; winds, 160 miles per hour. 
4 mi 
2 psi Moderate damage to houses (wall frames cracked, severe 
damage to roofs, interior walls knocked down); people injured 
by flying glass and debris; winds, about 60 miles per hour. 
7–8 mi 
[1] One-megaton burst at 6000 feet. 
[2] Pounds per square inch. 
Source: Leo Sartori, “The Effects of Nuclear Weapons,” Physics Today, March 1983, pp. 32–41, as 
reproduced in McMurrey 2002. 
 
The Civil Defense booklet (CDO 1950) is fairly pointed in describing the consequences of 
different types of nuclear blasts. Explosion in the air leads to more destruction from the blast and 
heat, but residual fallout is minor except under certain circumstances. The initial radioactive 
release is dangerous but only lasts a 
little longer than a minute. For an 
airburst explosion, almost all 
radioactive particles are swept up 
into the air and then dispersed over 
a large area. Ground bursts and 
explosions under water are a 
different story, leading to extensive 
radioactive contamination in some 
areas. High danger is present for  
the first hour and may linger for  
3–4 hours or more. Rain carries 
radioactive fallout to the ground, so 
it creates increased fallout hazard. 
 
Presentations on radioactive fallout typically assume a nuclear detonation at ground level, so that 
fallout patterns can be predicted. But an airburst would make fallout much more dispersed and 
major contamination much less likely, so that the blast, heat, flying objects, and initial radioactive 
waves are the primary concern, lasting a little longer than a minute. However, terrorists may only 
  19 
be able to carry out a ground burst incident, causing fallout to be a major issue. In the OTA study, 
for a 1-megaton ground burst in Detroit, if there is a 15-mph NW prevailing wind, fallout issues 
would extend in a fairly narrow band stretching to Pittsburgh (~200 miles). For a 15-mph SW 
wind, fallout concerns would extend for about 200 miles into Ontario and Quebec. 
 
With this quick look at potential CBRN threats, pre-planning and risk assessment for reduction of 
exposure to CBRN incidents can be more easily understood. 
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CBRN Incident Exposure Reduction 
 
ny effort to reduce the exposure of HVAC 
systems in facilities to CBRN threats must 
be part of a larger effort to prepare for possible 
incidents, reduce the possibilities of such 
incidents occurring, and minimize the possible consequences of such incidents. The “graded 
approach” to increasing HVAC security against CBRN incidents implies that the security of the 
HVAC system is a subset of overall facility security. The primary threat-reduction techniques 
involve reducing access to a building if necessary, and reducing access to HVAC systems and 
intakes as practical and possible. 
 
Federal facilities are already required to comply with fire and safety laws and regulations, and 
some must also comply with requirements related to preventing chemical releases or other 
incidents. Natural-disaster planning is also handled on a contingency basis. Some facilities may 
be under requirements to develop emergency action plans (OSHA, 29 CFR 1910.38). At ORNL, 
as at other DOE laboratories, management conducts drills regularly to exercise these 
requirements. Some levels of preparedness 
should already exist at many federal facilities 
based on these requirements. 
 
To a certain degree, what is required for CBRN preparedness is to extend the existing procedures 
and methods to cover additional situations and circumstances. In response to Homeland Security 
developments, additional procedures can be expected. 
 
A large array of resources now available cover the topic of reducing risk and vulnerabilities of 
facilities to CBRN incidents. One such resource is from the United Kingdom’s Office of the 
Deputy Prime Minister, Precautions to Minimise Effects of a CBRN Event on Buildings and 
Infrastructure (ODPM 2004). Although this 
document has a Crown copyright, it is apparently 
available to individuals and organizations for internal 
use. The document is useful because it addresses a 
continuum of prevention levels that covers pre-
planning for risk and vulnerability assessment, 
through preventive measures, and on to 
decontamination procedures, if required. The 
limitations of this document include 
A U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY Emergency Preparedness & Response Directorate 
Mitigation Division 
FEMA 
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oversimplification of some threats and an implied assumption that analysis with difficult-to-
obtain numbers will provide the answers needed. 
 
This document and others highlight the need for risk assessment and planning to reduce a 
facility’s vulnerability to CBRN incidents. In order to pursue a graded approach to exposure 
reduction, some type of risk analysis is required. The Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) has many resources available, having extended its focus 
beyond natural disasters to include protection of critical 
infrastructure. As a result, current information from FEMA is 
directly relevant for reducing the exposure of HVAC systems to 
CBRN incidents. In particular, FEMA has developed important 
information on risk assessment in a document on mitigating 
manmade hazards (FEMA 2003c) and has a series of risk 
management reports linked to its web site (http://www.fema.gov/ 
fima/rmsp.shtm). One of these reports, addressed to the insurance, 
regulatory, and financial sectors (FEMA 2003a), offers some 
useful perspectives. 
 
Risk assessment is an extensive topic, applicable to many different 
situations. One can assume that federal facilities have already 
evaluated industrial accident scenarios and done some planning for dealing with such incidents, 
but the many uncertainties in potential CBRN incidents make risk analysis especially difficult. 
Incidents such as terrorist attacks occur infrequently enough in the United States that there are 
few relevant records for analyzing any potential hazard. While many natural hazards are 
identifiable and even, in some cases, predictable, manmade hazards are, to a large extent, 
unpredictable. In addition, since resources on the reduction of CBRN vulnerabilities in HVAC 
systems are likely to be limited, some prioritization is necessary to evaluate where these efforts 
and expenditures will be applied. 
 
Quantifying the value of risk reduction for manmade hazards is a questionable exercise, since 
putting a value on preventing an extremely unlikely scenario is neither simple nor believable in 
most cases. Measures for preventing industrial accidents and terrorism are difficult to model and 
quantify. Those interested in more academic treatments of the risk quantification and 
conceptualization issues can consult Kunreuther et al. (2004) and Chapman and Leng (2004). 
FEMA once suggested that in the absence of a viable quantitative method, we should “adopt a 
more subjective, qualitative approach focusing on criticality, vulnerability, and threat in making 
decisions and setting priorities” (FEMA 2003b, p. 17). Some simple quantification may be 
needed though. 
  22 
 
Fig. 1. Simple method for prioritizing mitigation measures. 
 
The simple method diagrammed in Fig. 1 can be applied at different levels of an organization, 
with appropriate adjustments in concepts. For federal facilities, some levels of possible 
application are nationwide, region-wide, agency-wide, statewide, and facility-wide. For this 
document, an additional level of distinction involves examining assets within a specific facility 
based on the system-by-system coverage of the assets by the HVAC systems (i.e., determining 
which HVAC systems could affect which organizational assets in each facility). 
 
FEMA has extended this general idea in attempting to quantify the risk assessment for facilities 
(FEMA 2003e). This quantification extension is useful in many ways, and will be used in this 
document The method uses the concept of “asset value” to replace the “criticality” factor in the 
figure above. Rating schemes are used to assign numeric values to asset value, vulnerability, and 
threat level. These three values are then multiplied to arrive at a score, and different scoring levels 
are assigned — green, yellow, or red (low, medium, or high) — to the total risk categories. 
Readers wishing to explore this quantification method in depth should consult the FEMA 
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reference manual (FEMA 2003e). The information provided is most useful at an agency-wide 
level of planning. 
 
Considering these three elements of criticality, vulnerability, and threats, many CBRN threat 
issues were covered previously in this report. Table 2 presents one profile set of threat 
characteristics that can serve as a reminder of the threats covered previously, as well as providing 
additional details. The table 
includes an initial entry on the 
explosive threat for 
comparison. 
 
Asset criticality or value must 
be determined by each 
organization based on internal 
factors or considerations. The 
vulnerabilities of HVAC 
systems must then be 
considered together with asset 
criticality to develop 
mitigation priorities. Funding 
limitations are expected to be a major factor affecting mitigation project possibilities. Readers can 
consult FEMA (2003b, 2003c, 2003e, and Appendix B of 2003a) to examine additional 
information on an overall process for mitigating CBRN threats against buildings.  
 
Chapman and Leng (2004) provide more extensive information on quantification, simulation, and 
life cycle cost analyses related to large-scale hazards and risk management for buildings for those 
who need more information on those issues. FEMA is also developing a threat assessment tool. 
 
FEMA notes that “in conducting the vulnerability assessment, it is important to ensure that the 
focus is not only on hazard reduction but also on preparedness, response, and recovery 
considerations. . . . it is critical to consider the secondary hazards that could arise from well-
intended efforts to reduce vulnerabilities” (FEMA 2003c, p. 2-9). 
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Table 2. Threat profiles 
     Source: FEMA 2003c. 
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FEMA also advises that  
 
when addressing antiterrorism and other manmade hazard mitigation actions, you should 
recognize that many of these are sensitive and that information about them should be restricted 
to a very limited number of people. You must carefully consider whether each part of the 
process will be open to the public [or all employees] or whether for security reasons you will 
have only the planning team and perhaps a limited number of outside stakeholders (such as key 
public officials not on the planning team) discuss the best actions for [specific] facilities. 
(FEMA 2003c, p. 1-7) 
 
An example of part of the FEMA threat assessment tool under development which examines 
overall risk scoring for basic commercial building systems and infrastructures is shown in Fig. 2 
(FEMA Risk Management Project 452, “Methodology for Preparing Threat Assessments,” to be 
published). 
Fig. 2. Example of FEMA threat assessment tool under development. 
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Mitigation Technologies and 
Actions 
 
hat do the abbreviations RABIS, BAND, ARFCAM, 
RACIS, and PHILIS have in common? No, they are 
not new diseases. They are all highly advanced new 
technologies being developed by the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS’s) Homeland 
Security Advanced Research Projects Agency (HSARPA) for the Bioinformatics and Assays 
Development (BIAD) Program. Advanced technologies will be examined first in this section to 
indicate the direction needed to improve U.S. abilities to mitigate CBRN incidents.  
 
Why do we need advanced technologies for CBRN incident mitigation? Currently there is no 
truly real-time sensor capability for detecting the presence of deadly biological agents. Chemical 
sensing is available but needs improvement. Radiological sensors are available. The cost for most 
sensor capabilities needs to be reduced. We need more rapid processing of sensor signals. Many 
other improvements are needed. 
 
Briefly, the notional capabilities envisioned for the items listed above include the following: 
• RABIS — Rapid Automated Biological Identification System 
o Real-time monitoring for buildings and selected outdoor locations and events 
o Enabler of “detect to protect” response to attacks 
• BAND — Bioagent Autonomous Networked Detectors  
o Upgrade and expansion of previous system (BioWatch) 
o Reduced costs and expanded coverage 
o Support for other bioaerosol surveillance missions 
o Enabler of  “detect to treat” response to attacks 
• ARFCAM — Autonomous Rapid Facility Chemical Agent Monitor 
o “Detect-to-warn” system 
o Continuous facility monitoring 
o Monitoring of chemical warfare agents (CWAs) and high-priority toxic industrial 
chemicals (TICs) 
o Fully autonomous monitor capable of detecting dangerous levels of chemicals 
with a response time that provides sufficient warning to enable effective 
protection by limiting exposure 
W 
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• LACIS — Lightweight Autonomous Chemical Identification System 
o Fully autonomous and hand portable system with ability to detect allowable 
limits within 2 minutes 
o Capability to identify CWAs and high-priority TICs analytes 
o Local control unit simultaneously providing operational state and system status 
for a minimum of ten detectors 
• PHILIS — Portable High-Throughput Integrated Laboratory Identification System 
o Rapidly deployable field laboratory in a box capable of analyzing thousands of 
samples per day 
o Capability to identify and help characterize chemically contaminated areas 
o Lower detection limit meeting or lower than Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) permissible exposure limits (PELs) for the presence of CWA and TIC 
contamination 
In addition to HSARPA technology 
development, other efforts are ongoing. For 
example, several partners are working with 
researchers at ORNL to design and develop a 
“system of systems,” called SensorNet, to 
provide nationwide detection and assessment 
of CBRNE threats. The goal, as sensors 
become available for different threat agents, 
is real-time detection, identification, and 
assessment of CBRNE hazards. In addition to 
providing a data highway for detection 
systems, the overall “system” is also intended 
to include modeling capabilities and incident 
response protocols and direction to help 
mitigate CBRNE incidents. SensorNet has 
been deployed in Tennessee in some 
locations and at Fort Bragg in North Carolina, 
and has also been tested in other locations. 
The eventual coverage is intended to be 
nationwide. SensorNet is being considered as 
a key piece of the Guardian Installation 
Protection Program (see p. 6). 
 
The Special Projects Office of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is 
pursuing projects in many of these same areas, in a program area called Defense against 
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Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Weapons. Many national laboratories are also working on 
these technology areas. Project and program listings given here are not meant to be all-inclusive. 
 
Moving from future-looking technologies to the present, many technologies are now available to 
help with mitigation of CBRN events. For instance, chemical agent detectors are being used in 
the Washington, D.C., subway system; and efforts to expand the detectors to Boston subways 
have begun. 
 
Many CBRNE mitigation technologies are provided by organizations that belong to the NBC 
(Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical) Industry Group (http://www.nbcindustrygroup.com). 
Members of this group support nuclear, chemical, and biological warfare defense activities. In 
addition to military defense against chemical 
and biological warfare, interests of the group 
encompass domestic preparedness against 
chemical and biological terrorism and support 
for the Chemical Weapons Convention and other 
treaties. A handbook compiled by the group 
(http://www.nbcindustrygroup.com/handbook/ 
index08.htm) identifies currently available 
products and services. The topics in the NBC 
Industry Handbook include 
● Agent characteristics  ● Communications 
● Contamination avoidance ● Medical systems 
● Individual protection  ● Demilitarization 
● Collective protection  ● Research & development 
 ● Decontamination  ● NBC services 
 
The most extensive listings are under “NBC services.” As noted on pp. 13–14 above, the 
description of agent characteristics is a compact set of characteristics for several chemical and 
biological agents, grouped according to invasive method. 
 
It should be noted that the NBC Industry Group is not all-encompassing of key organizations and 
technologies, so one must look beyond what is offered on the NBC web site. 
 
HVAC Systems and Threat Profiles 
In order to plan reasonably to define CBRN threat mitigation priorities and strategies, one must 
consider both HVAC system characteristics and CBRN threat characteristics.  
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With HVAC systems one is concerned with airborne agents or contamination, so other vectors of 
delivery can be dropped from consideration. For threats from outside a building, HVAC systems 
should be shut off to reduce introduction of outside air into a building. All fan devices (e.g., 
exhaust fans) should be shut off. All doors and windows should be shut tightly, and elevators 
should not be used because they draw air flows into buildings.  
 
The HVAC response for biological or 
radiological agents released indoors is much the 
same as for an outdoor release: turn off all 
HVAC fans to prevent further dispersal, limit 
spread of contamination, and isolate the 
building. 
 
In the case of an indoor release of a CBR agent, 
one important first response is to evacuate the 
building, upwind. Other important responses 
become much more complicated. For a chemical 
release indoors, mitigation by dissipation is usually considered most effective, so leaving 
everything running is considered preferable in most cases. A fairly extensive report — Protecting 
Buildings from a Biological or Chemical Attack: Actions to Take before or during a Release, 
prepared by DOE’s Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL) (Price 2003) — discusses 
actions to take during an incident as well as actions to mitigate such incidents. The report 
(available at http://securebuildings.lbl.gov/) is particularly useful for gaining an understanding of 
the response issues related to chemical or biological incidents. Given that responses to 
radiological or nuclear incidents would be similar to responses for a biological incident, the 
advice for biological incidents can also be extended to these other types. 
 
Just as the graded approach to HVAC system protection must consider the overall efforts to 
mitigate CBRN incident effects, the critical issues here are that 
 
• mitigation actions are probably more important than mitigation 
technologies, and  
• HVAC actions and technologies are bound up in other actions and 
technologies in many mitigation responses. 
So in the graded approach, mitigation priorities will include response actions 
— before, during, and after a CBRN incident — in synergistic combination 
with the priorities for HVAC system or technology measures. 
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Technology Mitigation / Cost Profile 
Just as the nature of CBRN threats must be understood in attempting to establish priorities in 
mitigation measures, the nature of the “grades” of technological fixes must also be understood. 
The LBNL report highlights the importance of knowing whether to evacuate or not, depending on 
the type of incident. Evacuation and sheltering-in-place are part of the typical first line of 
response to CBRN attacks. However, some buildings, such as the main buildings of U.S. 
embassies on foreign soil, may need significantly enhanced protection like multiple levels of 
filtration and continuous positive pressurization of critical building assets, as evacuation may be 
dangerous.  
 
Figure 3 shows, in approximate terms, the change in costs as the level of technological protection 
of HVAC systems against CBRN incidents increases. Note that the cost scale is logarithmic — 
costs increase by a factor of 1,000 for each step on the scale. Thus, a wide range in costs can be 
found, but the general trends can be understood from this graph: as the level of protection goes 
up, costs go from hundreds to millions of dollars. In most cases, some mix of technologies is 
likely to be appropriate. Again, funding limitations are likely to severely limit what can be done. 
 
Fig. 3. Acceleration of costs as technological protection increases. 
 
The items shown in Fig. 3 do not cover all the categories of technologies that could be 
considered, but the general trend of technologies is indicated. At the low end, procedures for 
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evacuation and sheltering-in-place should be developed and implemented. Methods for control of 
HVAC systems for different types of CBRN events should be developed. If high-end 
technologies such as continuous positive pressure equipment are installed, people should be 
informed of the limits of any such equipment and what parts of buildings can be considered safer 
in case an external CBRN incident occurs. 
 
The high-end technologies generally 
attempt to isolate a building from potential 
external CBRN threats by filtering out 
CBRN agents that might come through the 
HVAC systems to make these systems 
secure, possibly killing biological agents 
that are very small, and pressurizing the 
building with the secure HVAC systems to 
keep CBRN agents from entering through 
any other means. This approach typically 
requires that the building envelope be sealed well. 
 
If facilities are to receive modifications to HVAC systems and development of incident 
procedures, building occupants need to understand what those systems and procedures are and 
how the protective systems are to be deployed. Occupants may also need training on the proper 
deployment of protection equipment and systems and on the modifications to building HVAC 
systems and related hardware. 
 
The range of activities, actions, and technologies that could be considered to prepare people and 
HVAC systems for increased security against CBRN incidents is large. An Internet search using 
the terms homeland + security + products will give readers some idea of the range.  
 
Energy Efficiency 
Finally, since FEMP is primarily 
concerned with the energy efficiency 
of federal facilities, readers should note 
that many higher-end mitigation 
technologies have the potential to 
significantly increase energy use and 
costs. Federal agencies, and energy 
managers in particular, have a special 
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interest in the relationships between building security and energy usage. Hadley (2002) presents 
many of the basic issues related to building security and energy efficiency and also presents ways 
energy improvements can help enhance security. FEMP has also developed a white paper 
covering some of the positive links between ensuring security and improving energy efficiency, 
as well as areas where tradeoffs may be required (Harris 2002). This paper provides information 
on the possibilities for synergistic benefits, as well as on tradeoffs. 
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HVAC System Vulnerability Mitigation 
Guides 
 
s indicated previously, the number of publications on building security and security 
guidelines has grown significantly in the last two years and continues to grow quickly. 
Several guides are mentioned here that address HVAC mitigation technologies, strategies, and 
actions. 
 
In addition to the LBNL report 
on protecting buildings (Price 
2003), LBNL has also 
developed user tools to help 
facility managers work through 
the vulnerability assessment 
process. The Building 
Vulnerability Assessment & 
Mitigation Program (BVAMP) 
helps develop building-specific 
advice regarding vulnerabilities 
in order to 
• help improve emergency preparedness, 
• develop building HVAC system control protocols for use during incidents or other 
emergencies, 
• plan for shelter-in-place responses, and 
• evaluate access restrictions that may be needed for building systems and information. 
 
The tool itself comes as a compiled Java file that runs on the Java Virtual Machine, with all 
modules compiled together in a Java archive (jar) file (LBNL 2004). The zip file containing the 
jar file also has versions of the building questions and building walkthrough process that can be 
read with a word processor, for those who want a preview before starting the process. 
 
As mentioned previously, the Edgewood Chemical Biological 
Center (ECBC) and the Army Corps of Engineers have 
released a guide (technical instructions) in draft form that can 
be accessed via the Internet entitled Protecting Buildings and 
Their Occupants from Airborne Hazards (USACE 2001). This guide provides information in both 
form and substance not typically found in other guides and should be studied, along with the 
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advice from the United Kingdom (ODPM 2004), LBNL, and www.ready.gov,  to scope out 
potential vulnerability mitigation options. The ECBC guide covers 
 
• pertinent facts about airborne hazards, 
• how to determine a building’s protective capability, 
• architectural and mechanical design features for protection, 
• security measures to prevent an internal release, 
• protective actions for perceptible hazards, 
• developing a protective-action plan, and 
• applying air filtration systems to buildings. 
 
Some of the measures are more practical for new construction or major modifications. 
 
Other guidance related to these topics can be found in the following sources: 
 
• Guidance for Protecting Building Environments from Airborne Chemical, Biological, or 
Radiological Attacks (NIOSH 2002) 
• Guidance for Filtration and Air-Cleaning Systems to Protect Building Environments from 
Airborne Chemical, Biological, or Radiological Attacks (NIOSH 2003) 
• Risk Management Guidance for Health, Safety, and Environmental Security under 
Extraordinary Incidents (ASHRAE 2003) 
• Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks against Buildings (FEMA 
2003e) 
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Risk Input Scales and Scoring 
 
ulnerability and risk assessment methodologies are extensive and varied. Surveys of these 
methods are continually conducted. Current results of such a survey and analysis by the 
DHS are not publicly available. Although vulnerability and risk assessment methods can be either 
simple or more involved and complicated than the methods presented here, the approach used 
here illustrates one basic means of assessing risk for building HVAC systems. This method uses a 
risk equation to calculate overall, relative scores. Other methods, such as simple checklists, 
comparison ratings, and specialized risk matrices, can also be used. 
 
The basic method presented here for prioritizing CBRN incident mitigation measures involves the 
following steps: 
 
• Selection of assets, whether buildings, people, departments, production lines, or other, to 
rank the value of each asset relative to that of other assets (criticality ranking) 
• Mapping of assets to specific HVAC systems for any HVAC-specific vulnerability 
assessments 
• Analysis of additional factors driving or limiting options for mitigation measures  
• Assessment of the vulnerabilities of each asset and its related HVAC system to CBRN 
incidents 
• Ranking of CBRN threat potential (threat assessment) 
• Performing a vulnerability risk assessment that considers asset criticality, threat potential, 
and vulnerabilities 
• Setting/staging mitigation priorities: actions, technologies, strategies, etc. 
 
Each element in this process is fairly complex and challenging in and of itself. Asset selection 
and rating is necessary in order to have a reasonable initial framework for analyzing ways to 
mitigate potential CBRN incident impacts on HVAC systems. Scoring can be numerical or 
comparative (pair-wise priority), although only numerical scoring will be presented here. 
 
Asset Selection and Rating 
Defining an asset categorization or classification scheme is the first challenge. Different schemes 
may be needed for different types of facilities and occupancies. The cornerstone of any security 
strategy is an understanding of an organization’s assets. Some understanding of asset value is also 
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necessary to effectively prioritize how critical each asset is to the mission of an organization. 
Contacts with organizational real property managers are probably necessary to some degree to 
select and categorize assets. Asset management is a large field that is not possible to cover in this 
short document, and classification and rating the criticality (value) of assets is part of asset 
management. 
 
In its Security Risk Management Guide (FAA 2002), the Federal Aviation Administration defines 
an asset as “as any person, place, thing, or commodity, for which there is a safeguarding 
requirement.” The notion of a “thing” could be extended to many possible categories, including 
departments, process lines, laboratories, and test cells. Similarly, groups of people or places or 
commodities could also be chosen as assets. The FAA guide notes that identification of assets to 
be safeguarded is a requirement in the security risk management process. 
 
Classification of assets should also be coordinated with the mapping of HVAC systems to assets 
served. Once assets to be rated for criticality are defined, levels of criticality need to be selected. 
These levels can usually be handled most easily by correlating descriptions of the levels with 
numerical values, with 
higher values meaning 
those assets more critical 
to the organization. Figure 
4 shows an example of an 
asset value scale from 
FEMA’s reference 
manual (2003e). Some 
practice with such scales 
is probably useful before 
conducting a full-scale analysis so as to develop an understanding of the interactions between 
vulnerability and threat scales and to develop the most reasonable category descriptions 
describing rating categories. Only assets with the highest values may need to be considered 
initially. Building occupants (employees and visiting workers at a minimum) should probably be 
considered in overall groups as assets also, with a value of 10 out of 10, regardless of whether 
smaller groups of the same people are classified as assets, since many lower-cost actions with 
important benefits can be accomplished with people. 
Fig. 4. Example of an asset value scale. Source: FEMA 2003e. 
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Vulnerability Assessments 
The discussion here assumes that, as asset 
classifications have been developed, mapping of assets 
to HVAC systems has been integrated into the asset 
classification scheme — that HVAC systems are 
intrinsically part of the asset categories. As indicated 
previously, the vulnerability assessment procedures 
(BVAMP) developed by LBNL (2004) are probably 
the most useful and can be used together with the 
guidance documents from NIOSH and others to 
develop vulnerability assessment procedures specific 
to the assets being evaluated. Users may wish to map 
types of vulnerabilities or vulnerability patterns to a 
simple scale as shown in Fig. 5 — or one might use 
quick, reactive scoring to test results. For numerical 
evaluation, some type of rating score will be needed 
for each asset. Some development work may be 
necessary to make the vulnerability scales match the 
types of assets and HVAC systems being evaluated.  
 
Threat Assessment 
This report has covered the potential CBRN threats in detail because the nature of the threats is 
complex. CBRN agents are often referred to as weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), although 
effective (deadly) use is inhibited by many factors. Some parties tend to promote fears related to 
these threats, while others downplay the potential for extensive deadly results. Economic 
disruption (although an area well outside the scope of this report) may be a more troublesome 
consequence of limited CBRN attacks, and possibly more destructive, as response with extensive 
deadly force might be morally out of scale, while less lethal responses may not have been 
prepared effectively and also might be seen as inappropriate for other reasons. 
 
CBRN threat assessment ratings and approaches are likely to 
change depending on proximate events. A rating given in the 
absence of any immediate elevated threat condition is, by nature, 
nebulous, since the likelihood of any CBRN incident is low for 
most federal facilities. In many cases, the level of threat from a 
Fig. 5. Examples of a vulnerability 
scale and an asset rating form. 
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CBRN incident will be similar, if not the same, for all assets at a given federal facility. Absent 
any immediate factors suggesting elevated threat level, the probability of any given CBRN 
incident might be considered low. Possibly, different numerical threat levels could be assigned to 
different types of CBRN threats. However, care should be taken that threat level, given its greater 
uncertainty, does not unduly influence any final scoring of overall risk. Ignoring threat could 
hinder wider-scale integration. 
 
A more immediate indication of elevated threat conditions would be expected to lead to a 
reevaluation of the threat level and modification to an overall risk analysis. A two-stage threat 
assessment might be needed. One possible second-level assessment factor set shown by FEMA 
(2003e, p. 1-24) and credited to the Kentucky Office of Homeland Security is shown in Fig. 6. 
One possible two-level method for scoring threat level would assign numerical scores to low 
(green) through severe (red) threat conditions — e.g., 0 for green through 4 for red. These 
immediate-threat-condition scores could be added to previous asset-threat-level scores to arrive at 
a new, two-level score. Other secondary, proximate-cause scoring methods might also be 
developed.  
 
Explosive threat might also be included in any analysis, to provide an overall comparison vector 
(set of risk scores) for all assets being analyzed. Although CBRN threat levels may be low, the 
explosive threat level could be very high. 
 
Risk Scoring 
Risk scoring involves generation of the overall scoring of the factors presented above. Some 
comparison of initial results with intuitive expectations and workable scoring ranges might be 
Fig. 6. Chart for scoring threat level. Source: FEMA 2003e, p. 1-24. 
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helpful in tuning the scales used for the threat, asset criticality, and vulnerability scores. Typically 
the category scores would be multiplied: 
 
Risk = Asset criticality score × Vulnerability score × Threat level score 
 
The calculated risk values can then be used to assign risk categories. The scales may need tuning 
to arrive at results that have the most meaning to users. Final scores then provide input to the 
combined analysis of risk and external factors such as resources for making changes. 
 
Combined Analysis of Risk and Additional Factors 
Once users are satisfied with the level of information provided by risk calculations, a final field 
assessment and analysis of risk and additional factors are conducted. Then prioritization and 
staging of CBRN incident mitigation options for HVAC systems can begin. Additional factors for 
the final analysis include such things as 
 
• funding limitations, 
• political priorities, 
• planning and funding horizons and cycles, 
• operational and system configuration factors, 
• graded-approach common-sense factors such as facility age and condition that were not 
properly considered in the scoring, and 
• synergistic funding and procedure, capital, or project alignment options. 
 
This analysis should set the stage for implementing and staging mitigation options. Integration 
into larger organizational planning efforts would require consistency in approach. 
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Mitigation Priority Example 
 
o provide a sense of how all the information and methods can work together, an example is 
provided below. This example is not definitive and not meant to be fully consistent with 
current security readiness or procedures at federal facilities. Rather, it is meant to show a practical 
application that integrates several concepts previously discussed. 
 
The fictitious agency considered here, Agency X, is a tenant occupying two floors of an office 
building somewhere in middle America. After the Oklahoma City incident, security against 
explosive threat was improved, which included securing the building perimeter. Access to the 
building now requires screening upon entry, 
with a known destination inside; but once 
inside, people could find ways to move around 
on most floors, including the two floors 
belonging to Agency X.  
 
A security screening directive has been issued 
by Agency X to all locations, including the 
part of the agency (local unit) on the two 
floors in this office building. This directive 
requires the local unit to examine security 
risks, including CBRN risks, and the directive has a topical area checklist to cover in the security 
screening. The Agency X local unit (AXLU) works through the checklist and finds that potential 
risks related to the HVAC systems in the building must be examined. AXLU contacts building 
management and its operating contractor (BMOC) to explain what it is now required to do and to 
ask if any help can be provided. 
 
Finding a guide on the Internet titled Mitigation of CBRN Incidents for HVAC Systems in Federal 
Facilities, AXLU considers how to examine possible security risks for the HVAC systems in its 
building, and it uses this guidance to respond to questions posed by BMOC. AXLU develops an 
initial asset criticality list and asks BMOC to map the HVAC systems to the asset list and also to 
provide comments on the asset list.  
 
AXLU examines the ODPM (2004) material and the LBNL (2004) BVAMP questions and walk-
through items. A determination is made that significant building systems expertise is needed to 
reasonably evaluate HVAC systems in the context of an overall program of CBRN incident 
mitigation, and a delay of almost a year occurs while a means of procuring the required expertise 
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is developed and the expertise is procured. The outside experts can be retained only for a short 
time due to funding limitations. 
 
With the needed expertise on board, AXLU conducts a walk-through assessment of its systems, 
building areas, and the roof to develop reasonably final results for its overall analysis. Threat 
factors are ignored, and only three assets are used: people overall and all agency property on each 
of the two floors of the building. An analysis of risk findings and additional factors is conducted. 
AXLU determines that only limited funds are available for any mitigation measures, and BMOC 
is also fairly constrained in what it can do. AXLU and BMOC decide to pursue the following 
mitigation actions: 
 
• Since people have high importance, AXLU determines that some minimal training is 
required for all personnel to inform them of CBRN threats and actions being taken 
• BMOC determines that all agencies in the building would benefit from similar training 
and agrees to help develop the training session in cooperation with other agencies in the 
building. Other agencies are asked to participate in the training development, and three 
other agencies agree to provide a representative to participate. The initial training 
material is developed and presented to the personnel of Agency X and any others 
interested. Three sessions are required to accommodate everyone for this initial training. 
• Based on the materials reviewed, AXLU determines that a computer resource–sharing 
agreement is needed with Agency Y in the next state, so that in the event of inability to 
use computer resources, either agency would be ready and could use the other’s computer 
resources during a short transitional 
period of detoxification, cleanup, or 
other disruptive corrective actions. 
• AXLU and BMOC determine that the 
main HVAC systems are reasonably 
secure, being in locked mechanical 
rooms on the same floors occupied by 
AXLU. An outdoor air supply fan on 
the roof, which provides air to the main 
HVAC systems, is less secure. BMOC 
agrees to install extra security cameras 
on the outdoor air fan and roof and include those camera views in regular security scans. 
• The building does not have sensors to measure wind speed and direction. BMOC agrees 
to purchase and install these sensors and connect them to the building energy 
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management system (this EMS is the only system that could handle the sensors). 
Installation of local readouts of these sensors on the two floors occupied by AXLU is 
paid for by AXLU. 
• There is no quick means of shutting either the HVAC or outdoor air fans off in an 
emergency. AXLU and BMOC agree to co-fund changes to building controls to develop 
a quick means of turning these fans off and on. In addition, an indicator of outdoor air fan 
status is added to several locations in the building, including the AXLU space. AXLU 
also pays to have BMOC install reliable, multi-attribute status indicators of the HVAC 
fans on its two floors. 
• AXLU purchases 12 CBR agent protective face masks for specific personnel, 7 on one 
floor and 5 on the other; and these 12 people receive instruction on use of the masks. 
(BMOC decides to buy a few also.) Practice drills on use of the masks are conducted 
each year, and these personnel are wardens with specific responsibilities during any 
emergencies. 
• AXLU funds are used to install dampers that shut off outdoor air to the HVAC systems 
on the floors occupied by AXLU. Three of the personnel with face masks on each AXLU 
floor are instructed in how to shut off outdoor air to the units using these dampers, as well 
as how to shut off and turn on the HVAC units in an emergency. Shutoff and turn-on 
procedures are practiced once a year. A concealed, sealed security compartment on each 
AXLU floor has the key to the mechanical room for a real emergency. 
• AXLU and BMOC develop new emergency management procedures, including threat 
identification procedures, evacuation and shelter-in-place procedures based on wind 
speed and direction, and communication protocols for different types of incidents. 
 
This list could easily be much longer for many situations. All the items described here had to be 
completed with very limited resources, so documentation was not extensive, and further 
improvements were needed. The training sessions continued to be offered about once a year, were 
picked up and enhanced by FEMA for wider use, and were expanded to include specific types of 
personal protective equipment available for attendees to try out. After waiting seven years for 
funding requests to work their way through the system, AXLU installed an enhanced filtration 
system that did not have an excessive pressure drop on the outdoor air system.  
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Conclusion 
 
omeland security efforts, including development of improved methodologies 
and technologies, continued in 2004 and will continue for the foreseeable 
future. The country has seen multiple attempted or completed large-scale attacks 
against civilian populations by extremists. Emergency preparedness throughout the 
United States has expanded in scope. Critical infrastructure has been identified as 
needing protection. Weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) have been identified as 
the most serious threat. Increased abilities to mitigate WMD attacks have been 
recommended by prestigious bodies. Information and guidance on how to protect 
facilities against WMD attacks have proliferated in the past two years. Federal 
agencies have promulgated directives requiring increased security against WMD 
attacks. Federal facility managers have asked FEMP whether there is any assistance 
that can be provided to deal with the directives, especially related to building 
ventilation systems. 
 
This short guide summarizes information related to mitigation of a subset of WMD incidents for 
federal facilities, although the information can be applied much more broadly than federally. 
Because WMDs can be scoped as comprising CBRNE agents, the WMDs addressed in this 
document are actually a subset involving only CBRN agents.  
 
Using the information in this guide, together with some of the reference resources available on 
the Internet, federal facility managers should be able to plan an initial assessment of possible 
CBRN mitigation strategies for HVAC systems. The ability to conduct a final field assessment 
and analysis that allow CBRN incident mitigation priorities to be established for facility assets 
and the HVAC systems that serve them is expected to be problematic because the required 
expertise does not appear to be readily available. The development of capable CBRN incident 
analysts and experts will require training and accrued experience over time. 
 
Following the initial setting of CBRN incident mitigation priorities, annual refinements to the 
assessment process and mitigation priorities should be expected. Given an apparent lack of 
unified assessment processes at this time among and within federal agencies, some gradual 
alignment and eventual standardization of these procedures should be pursued (e.g., the FEMA 
threat assessment tool [FEMA risk management project 452], which is a step in this direction; see 
p. 25 above). Methods for HVAC system assessments are available at this time but may require 
extensions to be more effective. Some pilot assessment and mitigation measure implementation 
projects appear to be needed. 
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The importance of people as an asset category has been stressed and should be given high 
emphasis throughout the process. The probable greater importance of mitigation actions and 
procedures compared to hardware technologies for HVAC system and CBRN incident mitigation 
solutions has also been emphasized. This emphasis may change as new technologies are 
developed and deployed. This relative importance is expected to hold true for most federal 
facilities.  
 
Current OSHA requirements related to emergency preparedness may be inadequate to deal with 
possible CBRN incidents, so increased training and exercises related to the full range of 
responses needed for different CBRN incidents also appear to be needed at federal facilities. 
Increased levels of response to CBRN incident mitigation probably also include significant new 
technologies, many of which are only concepts at this time. 
 
Energy efficiency should not be abandoned in 
the quest for security. FEMP has developed 
some initial ideas about synergistic system 
opportunities that apply to buildings, HVAC 
systems, and increased CBRN incident 
mitigation security. Significant additional 
work appears needed to better develop these 
ideas, reasonable methods of application, and 
some scaling of potential benefits from 
different approaches. 
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